Andrey Malenko

Andrey Malenko

Institution

Boston College

PhD Year

2011

Phone

617-552-3945

Email

malenkoa@bc.edu

FTG Membership

Member

Website

https://www.amalenko.com

Featured Work

Jan 3, 2026

Andrey Malenko

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Dec 30, 2025

Andrey Malenko

Paper for Event + Profile

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May 24, 2019

Andrey Malenko

Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty

We study a signaling game in which an issuer with private information about the distribution of the project’s cash flows designs a security to sell to an uninformed investor to raise financing for the project. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty and evaluates each security by the worst-case distribution at which she could justify the security being offered by the issuer. First, we show that both...

Apr 9, 2019

Andrey Malenko

Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty

We study a signaling game in which an issuer with private information about the distribution of the project’s cash flows designs a security to sell to an uninformed investor to raise financing for the project. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty and evaluates each security by the worst-case distribution at which she could justify the security being offered by the issuer. First, we show that both...

Feb 28, 2018

Andrey Malenko | Working Paper No. 00005-00

Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters

Proxy advisors play an important role by providing investors with research and recommendations on how to vote their shares. This paper examines how proxy advisors affect the quality of corporate decision-making. We analyze a model in which a monopolistic advisor offers to sell information to shareholders, who decide whether to acquire private information and/or buy the advisor's recommendation, and how to cast their votes. We...

Feb 28, 2018

Andrey Malenko | Working Paper No. 00004-00

Selling to Advised Buyers

In many cases, buyers are not fully informed about their valuations and rely on the advice of biased experts. For example, the board of the bidder relies on the advice of managers when bidding for a target in a takeover contest. We study the design of sale mechanisms to such "advised buyers". In static mechanisms, such as first- and second-price auctions, advisors communicate a coarsening...