We develop a dynamic contracting framework to study how partial commitment power affects long term employment relationships. In a continuous time moral hazard model, the principal can alter the contract at random, exogenously timed “alteration opportunities,” with their arrival rate...

We study pricing dynamics and risk-sharing in a market with rational investors and a Q-learning trader. The Q-learner's trading generates a feedback loop in prices: their demand for the risky security depends on their perceived benefit from trading, which in...

Generative AI has the potential to transform corporate innovation, but intellectual property (IP) created without sufficient human input is ineligible for protection by IP systems. We model a firm’s choice of AI versus human-capital use when investing in innovation, with...

We study markets in which traders acquire private information before submitting their schedules. We characterize conditions under which traders over-invest (respectively, under-invest) in information and trade excessively (respectively, insufficiently) on their private signals. These inefficiencies arise from a novel interaction...

Trading relationships in over-the-counter (OTC) markets are persistent and often exclusive, despite technological advances that have expanded clients' access to dealers. We rationalize this pattern in a model where trading relationships allow dealers to learn their clients' trading motives from...

We develop a theoretical framework that formalizes the conflicts of interest arising in continuation vehicles (CVs), in which general partners (GPs) transfer portfolio companies from an existing fund to a new vehicle they continue to manage. While CVs can enhance...