Papers
Demand-System Asset Pricing: Theoretical Foundations
Uploaded: Oct 10, 2026
Recent asset pricing methods estimate investor-level demand for financial assets. We show that leading demand systems omit the central mechanism of portfolio choice: substitution depends on payoff similarity under a latent measure...
AI Tokenomics: Pricing and Application Discovery in Foundation-Model Markets
Uploaded: Oct 10, 2026
Foundation-model providers observe rich usage histories and sell technologically distinct tokens to users running heterogeneous and expanding applications. Users choose tasks involving model- and workflow-specific token recipes predicted imperfectly beforehand, whereas application purpose, prototype success, and downstream revenue remain difficult...
Algorithmic Trading Architecture and Price Informativeness
Uploaded: Oct 6, 2026
We develop a model of algorithmic trading in which a better-informed algorithm competes with human traders who choose whether to acquire costly information and participate in the market. We compare a model-free algorithm, which learns how to trade based on...
Divide and Inform: Carving Up a Common Value Among Rival Bidders
Uploaded: Oct 3, 2026
A monopolist data seller designs and sells signals about borrower quality to competing lenders. Optimal signals raise lenders' profits, and hence seller revenue, by softening lending competition through two channels. Segmentation negatively...
Dynamic Disclosure and Incentives in Expert Services
Uploaded: Oct 2, 2026
We study dynamic mechanism design in expert relationships, such as those arising in healthcare, legal services, consulting, and asset management. An expert privately observes progress in resolving a client's problem. The client pays a fixed price...
When Are Two Heads Better than One? The Organizational Design of Innovation
Uploaded: Sep 28, 2026
We study the optimal allocation of tasks over the life cycle of an innovative project. Innovation requires two complementary activities, research and development, both subject to moral hazard. Agents also privately observe the quality of discoveries, so the principal must...